Opened 3 years ago
Last modified 3 years ago
#33180 new Cleanup/optimization
Debug 500 HTML broken with strict Content-Security-Policy (CSP)
Reported by: | Adam Johnson | Owned by: | |
---|---|---|---|
Component: | Error reporting | Version: | dev |
Severity: | Normal | Keywords: | |
Cc: | Triage Stage: | Accepted | |
Has patch: | no | Needs documentation: | no |
Needs tests: | no | Patch needs improvement: | no |
Easy pickings: | no | UI/UX: | no |
Description (last modified by )
When using a strict CSP header, the debug view is broken as the inline CSS and JS get blocked by the browser. The page is somewhat usable as all the text is all visible, but it isn't particularly friendly or necessarily obvious why it's broken.
For example:
I thought of a couple of potential fixes:
- Make the debug http response a special class that deletes any CSP header added to it. This would work for most cases but not if the CSP header is added outside of Django (WSGI middleware, a server wrapping runserver).
- Move the CSS and JS to separate URL's so they're compatible with CSP. They could be served by a special route/path in
runserver
.
I am personally leaning towards #2 - even though it's more complex, it is more general.
There's also some opportunity to modernize the CSS and JS in the debug page a bit, such as rewriting use of window.onload and onclick handlers.
To reproduce, you can save the below as app.py
and run python app.py runserver
:
import sys from django.conf import settings from django.urls import path settings.configure( DEBUG=True, ROOT_URLCONF=__name__, SECRET_KEY="django-insecure-r42jn$xf4g+=w@=l#m6ghqo0!$icww-h4+$5gojq(1ld$x%!6f", MIDDLEWARE=[f"{__name__}.CSPMiddleware"], ) class CSPMiddleware: def __init__(self, get_response): self.get_response = get_response def __call__(self, request): response = self.get_response(request) response[ "Content-Security-Policy" ] = "object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; default-src 'self';" return response def index(request): 1 / 0 urlpatterns = [path("", index)] if __name__ == "__main__": from django.core.management import execute_from_command_line execute_from_command_line(sys.argv)
Attachments (1)
Change History (10)
comment:1 by , 3 years ago
Description: | modified (diff) |
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comment:2 by , 3 years ago
Description: | modified (diff) |
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by , 3 years ago
comment:3 by , 3 years ago
Triage Stage: | Unreviewed → Accepted |
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Type: | Bug → Cleanup/optimization |
comment:4 by , 3 years ago
One complication is that the HTML email reporter may be used to render emails. Emails can't use separate CSS. I guess an implementation for #2 may need to pursue a separate CSS file that can be inlined when is_email = True. (The JS is only used for browser renders.)
comment:5 by , 3 years ago
I'm not too sure about a special route for runserver. I'm probably not the only person that sometimes uses gunicorn/etc. locally or in some other locked down environment where I still want to see the error pages. I'm not sure I have a good alternative though.
comment:6 by , 3 years ago
It needn't be done by modifying the server per se. It can probably be part of the WSGI application, which should work under gunicorn etc.
comment:8 by , 3 years ago
We could use a nonce with a modified version of my suggested fix #1, since any CSP header will be added *after* the response has been created. We'd have to detect the header being added and pull the nonce out of it (if it's there) or add it, both paths requiring us to parse the header. Sounds complicated to me.
comment:9 by , 3 years ago
I feel like ideally we get Content-Security-Policy
framework added to core (#15727) so there's a reliable way to edit CSP headers on a per-response basis.
Re moving js/css to separate file/url, Google's CSP Evaluator https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/ (linked from https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/web_security#content-security-policy) says regarding script-src: self
:
"Host whitelists can frequently be bypassed. Consider using 'strict-dynamic' in combination with CSP nonces or hashes." "'self' can be problematic if you host JSONP, Angular or user uploaded files."
(There's probably pros and cons either way, as you could still have injection in an inline-script in a template. script-src: self
is pretty popular, and contrib.admin
relies on it being there.)
Personally, I prefer the second option.
Follow up to #32624.